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How and why knowledge is first
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Abstract
This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).
Keywords
knowledge, evidence, knowledge-first epistemology, perception, reasons, internalism/externalism, value of knowledge
Publication Date
2017
Type
Book chapter
Published In
Knowledge first : Approaches in epistemology and mind
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Start page
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Page Range
19-45
ACU Organisational Area
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Published as green open access
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Open
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Controlled
