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Standing in a garden of forking

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Abstract
According to the Path Principle, a thinker has the propositional justification that she does because of the evidence she has and the support relations this evidence provides. Whenever a thinker properly added a belief to her belief set, this is (in part) because her evidence provided her a path that took her to this belief. Whenever a thinker cannot properly add a belief to her belief set, this is because her evidence does not provide her with the right path. Epistemic standing, on this view, is largely determined by the paths provided by a thinker’s evidence. If we can give an account of evidence, its possession, and evidential support in non-normative terms, we could then use the Path Principle to give a nice, reductive account of justification. It might appear that the Path Principle is platitudinous, but appearances are sometimes misleading. I'll raise two kinds of problems for the Path Principle.
Keywords
epistemic standing, evidential support, path principle, propositional justification, doxastic justification
Publication Date
2018
Type
Book chapter
Published In
Believing in accordance with the evidence : New essays on evidentialism
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Page Range
223-243
ACU Organisational Area
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Published as green open access
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Open
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